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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
REX PACE, BYRON PACE, KEITH 
PACE and HARVEY PACE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. PARRISH and IDA E. 
PARRISH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 7677 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODlJCTION 
In commenting upon appellants' statement of facts re-
spondents take the position that the statement is incomplete 
and misleading, being colored to reflect appellants' arguments 
and purposes, and it is particularly misleading and incorrect 
in that: 
(a) The respondents had not contracted to, nor did 
they, sell their own farm for $50,000.00; 
(b) Appellants avoid reciting the most believable 
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testimony relating to appellant's statements and 
repr~sentations concerning ownership of the res .. 
ervotr; 
(c) The respondents absolutely never examined the 
((River Bottom" land in Section 19 as contended 
by the appellants; and 
(d) The respondents did not request that interroga· 
tories be submitted to the jury. 
These discrepancies and others will be pointed out and ex-
plained in the argument hereinafter set forth. 
In ans.wering the contention of the appellants in the case 
before the court respondents are not going to attempt to 
secure a reversal of any of the findings of the jury or trial 
court or of the verdict as it now stands. It is maintained that 
the decision is reasonable and just and fully supported by the 
law and facts; and, merely because the findings or verdict are 
not assailed, respondents do not wish to create the impression 
that their case iS: weak. They actually feel that the judgment 
doesn't nearly compensate them for their actual loss and that 
the jury may have actually shown partiality to the appellants. 
Because of the burden placed on the appellate court in 
reviewing this and other numerous matters before it respond-
ents will, accordingly, simplify the argument as much as pos-
sible. 
Since appellants are basing their appeal almost entirely 
op the evidence in support of the jury's findings this rebuttal 
brief will concentrate on those. matters. Painstaking care and 
much research went into the preparation of the complaint and 
the instructions given to the jury, at least OJ:?. the part of the 
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attorney for respondents and by the trial judge. It appears 
that neither iten1 has been the subject of attack in appellants' 
brief or other\vise. And in denying appellants' motion for a 
ne\v trial respondents take the position that Judge Cowley 
r~led correctly. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action at law. 
t(The action of deceit is of very ancient origin. There 
was an old writ of deceit known as early as 1201, which 
lay only against a person who had misused legal pro-
cedure for the purpose of swindling someone. At a 
later period, this writ was superseded by an action on 
the case in the nature of deceit, which became the 
general common law remedy for fraudulent or even 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation which resulted_ in 
actual damage ... " 
Prosser on Torts (Misrepresentation), p. 704. 
In the case of Taylor vs. Moe>re, 87 Utah 493, 51 Pac. 
2d 222, plaintiffs brought an action for rescission of a real estate 
contract on the ground of fraud. The court pointed out that 
H ••• Jhis being an equity case" equitable relief. could not be 
granted since plain~iff was not promptly before the court 
(laches), therefore cc ••• the respondents by delay waived 
the right to rescind, and they must be left to their remedy 
at law for danzages.JJ In that case they quoted from Shappirio 
v. Goldberg, 192 U. S. 232 at p. 504: 
t(In other words, when a party discovers that he has 
been deceived in a transaction of this character, he 
may resort to an action at law to recover damages, or 
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he may have the transaction set aside in which he has 
been wronged by rescission of the contract ... " (Italics 
added.) 
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 5, Sec. 1526, states: 
"Setting a fraudulent bargain aside, however, is an 
alternative right given on equitable principles to the 
injured party, and, therefore, if this remedy is desired, 
it must be sought with reasonable promptness after 
the fraud has been discovered." 
Inasmuch as respondents asked for incidental relief in 
having the amount of the judgment deducted from the unpaid 
portion of the purchase price appellants have sought to con· 
vince this court that the case is one in equity. Throughout 
their brief they have indicated that the jury made a new con-
tract for the parties and that the relief sought was the can-
cellation of notes. But this is not so. Respondents are standing 
by their agreement to purchase the ranch. And in view of the 
case of Taylor v. Moore (supra) it would appear that they 
had no other choice. The sole remedy they seek is an award 
of damages due to misrepresentation. 
Appellants seek to have this court review the matter as 
. a trial da nova on the record on the grounds that the case is 
entirely in equity. Respondents maintain that the action and 
the r~lief sought make it. strictly a law action; that insofar 
as they ask the court to decree that the damages be deducted 
from the unpaid purchas~ price that portion of the action-
and that only-moves into the realm of equity aq.d is "cogniz-
able in equity" as pointed out in appellants' cited case of 
Forrester v. Jastad, to which we shall return promptly. Thus, 
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since the action is one at law, this court should not disturb 
the findings unless there is insufficient evidence to support 
them under the well-rec?gnized rule of this court. 
Appellants cite the Utah cases of Jensen vs. Howell, 75 
Utah 64; 282 Pac. 1034 and Greco vs. Graco, 85 Utah 241; 39 
Pac. 2d 318, to support their contentions. However, those 
cases involved attempts to secure relief other than damages. 
In the former case fraud was alleged but the relief sought 
was to have an express trust impressed upon an absolute con-
veyance of real estate and transfer of personal property; the 
latter case was an attempt to cancel and set aside a deed. Ad-
mittedly such actions exist in equity, but they do not support 
appellants' contentions. 
Appellants rely on the case of Forrester vs. Jastad, 167 
Pac. 55 (Washington) throughout their brief in support of 
their claim that this is an equity case and for other purposes. 
Although somewhat identical insofar as involving similar 
subject matter that case actually is better authority for re-
spondents since it_ is not in point on appellants' contentions but 
is in point for respondents. 
Quoting the very sentence preceding that found on page 
15 of appellants' brief the Washington court said: 
t tThe appellants first contend that the action was one 
for damages for the breach of a contract, and there-
fore the allowance of equitable relief by the court 
was erroneous. The complaint was based upon the fraud 
of appellants; but, instead of seeking rescission on that 
ground, they sought to recover damages ... Under Rem 
Code No. 15 3 (one fo'rm of action under Code) an 
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action tnay be maintained for both legal and equitable 
'relief.'' (Italics added.) 
Quoting Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2: 
. ltThere shall be one form of action to be known as -
lcivil action.' " 
And from Rule 8: 
( ( . . . Relief in the alternative or of several different 
types may be demanded." 
Thus, we have the situation .of a legal action for fraud 
wherein respondents sought and secured damages, the matter 
being ((cognizable in equity" for the purpose of spe~ifying 
how damages should be paid by deducting the amount from 
the unpaid portion of the purchase price. This element of 
equity cannot be said to so reach back to the lawsuit itself so 
as to open all of the evidence to a trial da nova on the record. 
Had we sought to set aside the contract the result might be 
otherwise. In a non-code state respondents would satisfy the 
judgment by execution. Because the code permits equitable 
relief in a law action in the incidental manner sought in this 
case, to hold that appellate review extend to the limits pro-
posed by appellants would defeat much of the purpose of 
the codes. 
In fact the procedure sought by respondents in their 
complaint seems to be distinctly in line with proper pro-
cedure under the codes of code states. In preparing the prayer 
for relief in the complaint plaintiffs relied on the case of 
Paolini v. Sulprizio, 201 Cal. 683; 258 Pac. 380: 
l(If the contract remains executory, the damages 
which he is entitled to recover are no other and no 
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greater than those which would be awarded to a party 
\vho has fully executed his contract. From any award 
which may be made because of the fraud must be de-
ducted any part of the purchase price." 
The foregoing rule applies to the case at hand quite clearly. 
While in the cited case the unpaid balance of the purchase price 
was reduced below the award for damages the rule should be 
the same in the case at bar "·here the damages do not measure 
up to the unpaid balance of the purchase price by any means. 
The proposition advanced by appellants appears too 
elementary for further argument. 
PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED EVIDENCE PROVING 
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD. 
(a) In General 
ttFraud may be found from a variety of circumstances. 
There is no general rule for determining what facts 
will constitute it, but it is to be found or not according 
to the special circumstances of each particular case. 
With regard to modes of perpetration, methods of 
defrauding may be broadly classified as being misrep-
resentation, concealment, or false pretenses." 
23 Am. Jur. 762. 
The Utah case of Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 6;· 
Utah 495; 227 Pac. 791 clearly sets forth all of the essential 
elements of fraud to be proved in establishing a cause of 
action. In preparing their complaint and in conducting ·the 
trial plaintiffs were careful to cover each essential element, 
and the jury was so instructed (Instruction No. 2) : 
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"Fraud consists of a misrepresentation of an existing 
fact or facts, which were material in inducing the 
plaintiffs to purchase the defendants' farm for the 
price agreed upon. The misrepresentations must have 
been made by the defendants, either knowing them 
to be false or being in ignorance of whether they were 
true or false, with the intention that they influence 
plaintiffs to so purchase the farm; and the plaintiffs 
must have relied on the misrepresentations to their 
injury in so purchasing the farm, and must have been 
entitled to rely on the misrepresentations under the 
circumstances." 
(R. A-18) 
This lawsuit involves the sale of a 640-acre ranch located 
at Mountain Green, Morgan County, Utah. At the time of 
sale the ranch consisted of a house, out-buildings, certain 
items of livestock and equipment, 63 acres of irrigated land, 
30 or 40 acres of dry land and some 540 acres, more or less, 
of grazing land, covered with sage brush an~ grass. The area 
is set out on Exhibit A-to which plaintiffs will frequently 
refer. 
Dissecting the ranch from northeast to southwest runs 
Cottonwood Creek. To the east of Cottonwood Creek the land 
slopes gradually- to the south. On the west of the creek in 
the upper two-thirds of the farm the land rises rather sharply 
and is_ on a considerably higher elevation. 
In this latter area, high above most of the farm, exists an 
imposing man-made reservoir of an area of approximately 
20 acres which stores early spring water from a ditch leading 
into it for use during the summer months (Ex. D, F and 30). 
As the undisputed evidence shows the reservoir was used by 
10 
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some four or more farmers in that area to water their lands 
and, in this connection, they had formed the Northwest Irri-
gation Ditch Company, a non-profit incorporated water as-
sociation. 
It is around the peculiar and novel facts surrounding this 
reservoir, and the representations (and concealment) connected 
therewith that the nub of this lawsuit is found. Although 
other representations \Yere made to the plaintiffs concerning 
the farm the basis for their belief in such representations relat-
ed directly to their belief that they were receiving the entire 
reservoir in the purchase of the farm. This fact of the insepa-
rability of the misrepresentations complained of must be kept 
in mind at all times throughout this brief. 
(b) Defendant made actionable false representations 
nzaterial to plaintiffs' purchase of the farm. Since the damages· 
awarded plaintiffs in this case, with the exception of $180.00, 
arose out of three items of misrepresentation, and inasmuch 
as defendants have centered their attack primarily on these 
three items, plaintiffs will not attempt to cover the smaller 
issues of fences ($100.00 damage award) or hay removed 
from the farm ( $80.00 damage award). The evidence on 
those items is too clear to create controversy. 
The representations made by defendant, all of which 
the jury found to have been made and to be untrue, while 
dealing with plaintiffs prior to their purchase of the farm 
in question, were as follows: 
(1) AS TO THE RESERVOIR: 
1. ~~I own the reservoir.'' (T. 29) 
11 
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2. UThe reservoir is on my property." (T. 29, 130) 
3. .elf the deal went (goes) through the reservoir 
went (goes) with the place." (T. 116) 
That the reservoir was not owned by the defendant and 
that it did not go with the place were never denied. Defend-
ant admits that he never told the plaintiffs that others had 
interests in the reservoir (T. 25, and Brief 21, 22 and 23): 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Did they know at the time of the 
transaction there was water stock or merely one-
fourth of the reservoir or one-fourth of the water? 
A. (By Mr. Parrish) I suppose they knew that stock 
belonged to the northwest irrigation ditch com-
pany. If they had asked me I would have told 
them. (Italics added). 
From 23 Am. Jur. 854, I quote: 
n ••• Generally speaking, however, in the conduct 
of various transactions between persons involving busi-
ness dealings, commercial negotiations, or other rela-
tionships relating to property, contracts, and miscella-
neous rights, there are times and occasions when the 
law imposes upon a party a duty to speak rather than 
to remain silent in respect of certain facts within his 
know ledge and thus to- disclose information, in order 
that the party with whom he is dealing rna y be placed 
on an equal footing with him. In such a case a failure 
to speak amounts to -a suppression of a fact which 
should have been disclosed and is a fraud. As a matter 
of fact, in such circumstances a failure to state a fact 
is actually equivalent to a fraudulent concealment and 
amounts to fraud just as much as an affirmative false-
hood." 
Defendant further admits in his complaint making the 
statement, nThe reservoir ts on my property." This latter 
12 
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remark standing alone, in the absence of suspicious circum-
stances or other explanatory statements, carries the innuendo 
of complete ownership. But let us examine further. 
Although stipulated that the abstract was silent thereto 
plaintiffs introduced concrete evidence showing that the reser-
voir was not even on defendants' property although defendant 
testified ( T. 8) that it was entire/ y so located. This evidence 
consisted of a Warranty Deed, signed by each of the two de-
fendants (Ida E. Parrish and Joseph A. Parrish) on November 
21, 1932 and recorded on March 16, 1934. It is found in . 
Book M, page 3 73 of the Morgan County records and is com-
pletely set out on page 119-A of the transcript. In this deed 
the defendants conveyed to the Northwest Irrigation Ditch 
Company, grantee: 
HAll right, title and interest, amounting to nine-
tenths ( 9 I 10) in that certain Reservoir and Reservoir 
Site known as the old "Pond Hole" situated in the 
Northwest quarter of Section 19, Township 5 North, 
Range 2 East of the Salt Lak~ Meridian." 
In their brief defendants contend that plaintiffs must 
make out their case, if at all, on the two statements, ('I own 
the reservoir. The reservoir is on my place.'' While claiming 
that they are quoting ('all'' of the. evidence relating directly 
to the reservoir (Brief p. 19) they are carefully and deliberately 
avoiding what would normally be considered the most be-
lievable type of testimony-that overheard by a totally dis-
interested third person. 
As shown by the evidence Rex Pace, at the time he first 
contacted the defendants, was with Mr. Reynold Blackington, 
13 
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a former well-known resident of Morgan County. The latter 
introduced ·Rex Pace to the defendants and returned to the 
car while Rex Pace talked with the defendants as to whether 
they would sell their farm. When Rex Pace returned to the 
car Mr. Blackington overheard the third reference to the reser-
voir, which defendants, ravoid discussing (T. 116): 
BY MR. FULLER: 
Q. Did both of them walk out to the car? 
A. They both came out together. 
Q. Did you ever hear any of the discussion at that 
time? 
A. Only part of it. 
Q. Was any discussion made relative to the reservoir 
on the farm? 
A. As we were getting ready to go Mr. Parrish said, 
CCI£ the deal went (goes) through the reservoir 
went (goes) with the- place." (Verb tense 
added). 
The jury had good opportunity to observe Mr. Blacking-
ton's demeanor and the defendants had ample opportunity to 
cross-examine him fully. In such a sparsely populated county 
the jurists were also undoubtedly aware of Mr. Blackington's 
reputation for truth and honesty. 
Although defendants contend in their brief that the state-
ments made merely identify the extent of defendants' prop-
erty we feel that more positive representations could hardly 
be made. The jury, too, felt so inclined . 
. 
Defendants in their brief refer to the statement incorpor-
14 
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ated in the Warranty Deed given plaintiffs by defendants where-
in the water rights were conveyed as follows: 
((Together with the tenements, hereditaments and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise ap-
pertaining, including all water and water rights used 
in connection with the land." (See R. A-32). 
Since the water was represented by stock certificates in an 
incorporated water association, it is contended that had Mr. 
Perry, defendants' attorney, known of this fact he would have 
used a different method of transferring the water rights. Since 
the water was not appurtenant to the farm the purported 
method of conveyance passed nothing. to the plaintiffs. And 
this situation exists to this very day. Water rights in the 
State of Utah are transferred as follows (Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, as Amended by Laws of 1945) : 
Section 100-1-10: 
uw ater rights shall be transferred by deed in sub-
stantially the same manner as real estate, except when 
they are represented by shares of stock in a corporation, 
in which case water shall not be deemed to be appurten· 
ant to the land; ... " (Italics added.) 
The water certificates, properly endorsed and· re-issued, 
was the proper medium for transferring defendants' share 
of the water to the plaintiffs. The method used merely put 
the plaintiffs off-guard and confirmed their beliefs; the proper 
method would have quickly clarified the type and amount of 
water right being received. 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs should be barred from 
15 
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recovering for the reason that Rex Pace signed the papers 
after his two brothers and his father were informed that the 
water rights were not as represented. But the evidence shows 
that plaintiffs believed themselves unable to extricate them-
selves from the situation upon the advice of legal counsel, 
which they immed~ately sought. Furthermore, defendants 
forget that the damage was done on and prior to October 17th, 
1947-some 48 days before the papers were signed. In the 
meantime the plaintiffs sold their farm (belonging to plaintiff 
Harvey Pace) in the Uintah Basin for $25,000.00 (T. 56)-
obviously receiving less than would have been received had 
they had sufficient time to find a ready and willing purchaser 
• 
under normal circumstances (T. 28). In this connection plain-
tiffs had uprooted and dispossessed themselves of all of their 
former associations and property in contemplation of purchas-
ing defendants' farm. 
Three of the four plaintiffs had signed the papers. Under 
the circumstances is it any wonder that the parties elected to 
continue under the agreement and seek damages when the 
full injury resulting from the fraud was determinable, rather 
than to immediately seek recission of the contract? (See Taylor 
vs. Moore, supra, as to their right of election of remedies.) 
(2) AS TO THE ROLLINS' FIELD: 
t t Brother, all of the ground you see down there 
belongs to me." (T. 32, 92). 
While standing at· point ttA'' of Exhibit A on October 
17, 1949 (the date of the inspection trip over the farm) Mr. 
Parrish held out his hand and made the foregoing statement. 
16 
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Included within the "ground you see down there" was a tract 
of land containing 11% acres of choice ground. It was un· 
doubtedly the most clearly visible tract of land in their view. 
This can be seen on Exhibit E (designated by an arrow) and 
in the reverse direction on Exhibit 7. It shows as Field "E" on 
Exhibit A. Although defendant contended at the trial that 
the statement was made only as to the cchollow" portion of 
what lay below their gaze, Byron Pace testified that the par· 
ticular tract was definitely pointed to and that the defendant 
made specific reference (T. 92) to it. 
This particular piece of ground, although once a part of 
the farm (T. 167), actually belonged to Lee Rollins, a neighbor. 
It was fenced, the ditch from the reservoir ran around it (and 
Since plaintiffs believed they were receiving the reservoir 
and since this was irrigated land watered from no other source 
the assumption that it was the defendants' was very logical), 
it lay in a straight line with defendants' other fields on both 
the near and far side of the Rollins' land, the road from de-
fendants' house to the reservoir (which they couldn't travel 
that day due to muddy conditions) ran around this particular 
field, and it lay in a ccpocket" or valley along with defendants' 
land, bordered on one side by hills and on the other side 
by the tall cottonwood trees of Cottonwood Creek. 
From 23 Am. Jur. 823 (~raud & Deceit) the following 
rule is stated: 
ttFraud may be predicated upon the fact that one 
dealing commercially in land falsely represents that cer· 
tain land is included in the tract disposed of*, or mis· 
represents the lines or boundaries of the land, thereby 
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leading the representee to believe that a certain tract 
is covered by the deed where in fact it is not; . . . " 
*Referring to Utah as following the rule in the case 
of Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408; 48 Pac. 37. 
The Metzler case involved an action for damages on the 
grounds of fraud and deceit. The plaintiff had not examined 
the property, but relied on the defendants' representations 
that the lots produced a definite rental per month, that they 
were in a definite location and that they were high and dry. 
The court held that 
t t • • • a willful representation by an owner, in the 
exchange of ·real estate, that the property exchanged 
was high and dry, and located in a particular place, 
which representation was relied upon by the purchaser 
as true without an inspection of the premises, but 
which was false, and which operated to the purchaser's 
injury, is an actionable fraud." 
From 2~· Am. Jur. 819: 
ttlt is a well-settled principle that false statements 
or misrepresentations as to the location of real prop-
erty which is the subject matter of a transaction con-
stitute actionable fraud and will sustain an action of 
deceit or constitute ground for rescinding the contract, 
provided they are of such a character and are made 
in such a way that the representee has a right to rely 
on them." 
Because the roadway leading around the Rollins' field 
was muddy when the inspection was made (T. 41) the parties 
didn't closely examine the field other than from the references 
made at point ttA" of Exhibit A. 61 A. L. R. 527 states the 
rule further: 
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(t {e) Property at a distance or inaccessible. Where 
the subject of a sale is at a distance or is otherwise in-
accessible at the time of the sale, the purchaser has 
the right to rely upon the seller's representations with 
respect thereto, and may assert as against the seller 
the latter's fraud or misrepresentation concerning the 
thing sold, although it would have been possible for 
him to have investigated the matter for himself." 
The jury wisely found that the defendant made the state-
ments concerning the Rollins' field and that the facts and cir-
cumstances satisfied a case of actionable fraud. 
(3) AS TO THE ttRIVER BOTTOM" GROUND: 
1. celt is pretty good land ... ; here in the lower end 
of 19, right here, yes, or this one here is just as 
good; some of it is better'' (than the land in the 
South Field). (T. 17) 
2. ICThe ground in '19' . . . was the same texture as 
that we had just seen . . . " (in the South Field) . 
(T. 45) 
The first foregoing statement, together with more addi-
tional interrelated remarks, was volunteered by the defendant 
on direct examination as having been told to plaintiffs. The 
second statement was Rex Pace's testimony as to what the 
defendant said regarding the land marked tcSec. 19-Pasture 
-River Bottom-Area ·K'-on Exhibit A. The foregoing 
statements are the direct items of evidence introduced at the 
trial; however, throughout the testimony it is clear that con-
siderable conversation occurred relative to the fact that plain-
tiffs could plow up and farm the particular area (with, as 
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plaintiffs believed, an ample supply of water from the reser-
voir they thought they were purchasing) . 
The representation made to plaintiffs concerning the 
particular area was made at the time they actually went into 
the South Field and dug into the ground at point "J" on Ex-
hibit A. This land had been farmed and was represented as 
being ((good" ground by numerous witnesses. However, when 
plaintiffs actually plowed part of the "River Bottom area 
(encircled as area UK" on Exhibit A) they found the land to 
be of a much different texture, being more rocky, gravelly 
and of such a type that their crops withered and burned (T. 
46). It was of an entirely different type and quality (T. 48). 
And not having sufficient water-their actual interest in the 
reservoir being but one-fourth-they could not have grown 
crops anyway. 
The neighbors who testified as witnesses for each side 
(rather reluctantly) were quite definite that the land in ques-
tion in the "River Bottom" area of Sec. 19 was of a different 
texture and quality: 
WITNESS ROLLINS (for plaintiffs) : 
((No, I would say not. It is shallower, more rocks, 
showing cobble rocks and gravel." 
WITNESS. WILKINSON (for defendants) : 
nw ell, it is a little more gravelly." 
Defendants, in their brief, have attempted to convince 
this court that the plaintiffs actually inspected the ground in 
controversy-marked Sec. 19, Pasture, "K" and River Bot-
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tom. However, the jury was soundly convinced ( 8-0) that 
no inspection of the land in question was made (R. A-56). 
In fact, the representations and matters concerning this area 
were found for the plaintiffs by the jury by a unanimous con-
currence-one of the few places in the trial where such com-
plete unanimity existed. 
The jury properly found that no inspection was made of 
the area (which lies east and to the right of the red line mark-
ing the fence going North from the South Field on Exhibit 
A). The record is ample to support such fact: 
Witness Rex Pace on direct examination (T. 58): 
A. I got out of . the car at two different places. 
Q. Where were they? 
A. At point ttA" and point tel" 
Again (T. 66): 
Q. When you and Mr. Parrish came down to the area 
immediately above the south field did you at any 
time actually inspect the soil in the river bottom 
area marked Section 19 and area K? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't actually inspect it? 
A. No, sir. 
Point ttl" (located north of the South Field on the green 
line (roadway) on Exhibit A) was the only place in the 
area where the parties got out of the car other than at point A. 
It was near this point that the inspection of the South Field 
was made and also where the most distinct representation 
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concerning the River Bottom area of Section 19 was made. 
At no other points did the parties get out of the car for the 
purpose of making an inspection of soils. This was further 
admitted by the defendant himself (T. 132): 
BY MR. PERRY: 
A. So here we go, now we came down here (pointing 
to roadway east of field etC" on Exhibit A), we 
crossed the creek and then we came down through 
the little pasture and around here (east of field "G" 
on Exhibit A), and we stopped there (Point "I" on 
Exhibit A), and I told them ccyou better get out now." 
Continuing further on page 132 of the transcript: 
A. '' . . . I said 'you better go over the south field and 
see for yourselves.' ... " 
Defendants are attempting to convince the court that by 
driving over the roadway that lies some distance west of the 
land in controversy the plaintiffs should have seen the character 
of the soil. But what they fail to tell the Court is that this 
was an obvious waste area-farmers usually put roads on 
waste ground if possible-and was nearer the rocky Cotton-
wood Creek. Furthermore, the ground in the area in question, 
1 ying to the east of them some distance, was covered with 
grass and sage brush, thereby preventing them from seeing 
possible rocks. 
Witness Rex Pace, upon cross-examination, made it very 
clear that the river bottom area referred to by defendants in 
their brief was not the ((River Bottom" area about which the 
representations were made (T. 60). 
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Q. You went over the river bottom ground twice? 
A. Along this road, yes. 
And at page 63 of the transcript: 
Q. When did you learn the river bottom had more rocks 
than the south field? 
A. That was also next spring. 
Q. Couldn't you see them when you traveled over them? 
A. I don't think I ever traveled over them. 
(4) IN GENERAL. 
Defendants take the position that in proving fraud it 
is necessary to establish an "intent to deceive." Such is not 
the true and correct rule. The only "intent" that must be estab-
. t 
lished is that the defendant intend the plaintiffs be induced 
to purchase such property; the nature of the statement made 
must only be ((knowingly false" or that the speaker be unaware 
of its truth or falsity (see Stuck vs. Dt:lta, supra, and as cited 
in defendants' brief; also Instruction to Jury (quoted supra) ) . 
Quoting from Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 581, p. 721, 
note 7: 
uln an action of malicious prosecution, where by the 
substantive law, intent is regarded as an element, evi-
dence as to intent is admissible. If, however, the action 
is for false representation the defendant may not intro-
duce any evidence as to his 'intent,' i.e. that he did not 
intend to defraud the plaintiff, because by the sub-
stantive law it is the fact of misrepresentation and 
not the intent with respect thereto that is regarded as 
material and relevant.'' 
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Plaintiffs will not content themselves with the law, how-
ever, but will show that the defendant actually had an ccintent 
to deceive." While traveling between point CCI" (just above 
the South Field) and the reservoir, the defendant, on direct 
examination, recites as follows: 
A. Well, after we came from there we came to where 
the trees were down west, and he said to me he was 
going to push those over and farm that land. I 
thought rmaybe you will or maybe you won't. I 
don't think he has done it to this day b~ause that 
land there I used to pasture ... '' 
Again at page 145 of the transcript on cross-examination: 
BY MR. FULLER: 
Q. You stated on direct examination, (II thought that 
cmaybe you will and maybe you won't." Is that what 
you actually thought? 
A. Will or won't what? 
Q. Farm that area and root up the trees? 
A. No, I won't. I won't. 
Q. What I mean is, you stated when Rex made tha·t 
statement you said ccyou thought to yourself, 'maybe 
you will or maybe you won't.' 
A. I might have thought that but I didn't mention it. 
I think he thought he would-I thought right. He 
hasn't to this day. 
Q. Why did you think he possibly would? 
A. Oh, I don't know as to that. I didn't understand him 
well enough, perhaps. I know I wouldn't, none of 
the land around the trees in there ... 
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Q. You didn't tell Rex that you thought he wouldn't? 
A. No, I heard him make the femark. I didn't argue 
with him. That is as far it it goes. 
Q. Didn't you consider it a little unfair not to warn him? 
A. lHaybe I did and maybe I didn't. I wasn't going to 
argue with him nluch. I took them over the land and 
they could see the land and judge for themselves. 
From 23 Am. Jur. 854: 
((The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it re-
lates to non-disclosure, that a charge of fraud is main-
tainable where a party who knows material facts is 
under a duty, under the circumstances, to speak and 
disclose his information, but remains silent. Situations 
evoking the duty of disclosure may arise in various 
ways in different cases." 
Again at page 195 of the transcript, Byron Pace testified: 
Q. At any time you were having the discussion (while 
visiting with Mr. Parrish on May 6, 1950) was 
anything mentioned about the view you saw from 
point ((A"? *Material in parenthesis added. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was said on that day? 
A. Rex asked him, CCMr. Parrish, how come we didn't 
get this piece of ground?" (the large piece of 
ground he pointed to us from point teA," when he 
said: c 'Brethren, all the land below you belong to 
me.") 
Q. What did Mr. Parrish say to that remark? 
A. He was silent for two or three minutes, then he 
said: "You got what the deeds stated." 
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And on direct examination (T. 131) the defendant fur-
ther spoke his mind: 
A. tc • • • They told me that time, 'We are going to 
farm all of that hill.' I never said much, I knew I 
hadn't been doing it, maybe they_ knew what they 
were talking about. I didn't know, that is up to them, 
but that is how it was . . . " 
These young men, coming from a farm area entirely for-
eign to defendants' farm, being lead to believe that they had 
acquired a virgin area with great possibilities, and tr~ting 
implicitly in this man who referred to them as "Brethren, 
etc.", were entitled to be informed of the latter's knowledge 
of the peculiar nature of the farm. This is especially so con-
sidering the fact that he had lived on it all of his life and 
had farmed and owned it tfor 30 or 40 years (T. 7). The 
jury fairly found that the defendant was doing a bit of 
((sharp trading." 
As to the matter of what type of uintent" is necessary in 
making a statement that is an element of actionable fraud 
our Utah court has gone far beyond the instruction given to 
the jury. In Oberg vs. Sanders, 111 Utah 507; 184 Pac. 2d 
229, this Court said: 
( t ••• He failed to prove that defendants made a false 
representation that the poults were free from disease, 
and he consequently failed to prove that defendants 
made some statement with knowledge of its falsity or 
that defendants knew of conditions which would make 
such a representation a reckless one .. . n 
And in the case of DeFrees vs. Carr, 8 Utah 488 (a fraud 
case) the Court went even further: 
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rule: 
ttAnd even if one misrepresents a material fact by 
mistake, relief will be granted; for the assertion of 
what he does not know or believe to be true is equally 
unjustifiable in law as the assertion of that which is 
known to be false.'' 
In the annotation found at 61 A. L. R. 508 we find this 
H (A) Reckless rnisrepresentations. A number of 
jurisdictions have adopted the rule that it is immaterial 
that the seller does not know his representations to 
be false, where he makes them recklessly or without 
knowing them to be true; in any event, the buyer is 
warranted in relying upon the seller's positive state-
ment of an existing material fact.'' 
In failing to inform plaintiffs that others had interests 
in the reservoir, in failing to clarify the fact that the Rollins' 
Field didn't go with the farm and in refusing to tell plaintiffs 
what he knew of the ('River Bottom'' ground, defendant was 
guilty of concealment. He told plaintiffs, in effect, half-truths. 
Their brief condemns plaintiffs for not having "suspicious 
minds'' at all times. In other words, were plaintiffs required 
to inquire as to whether they were buying subject to an out-
standing lease, whether machinery or animals were mortgaged, 
was there a mechanic's lien on the reservoir or house, etc? 
We think that in the absence of suspicious circumstances 
(hereinafter discussed) no such unusual duty should be placed 
on any purchaser. 
Defendants, throughout their brief, attempt to pick out 
flaws in plaintiffs' presentation of eviden~e, forgetting that 
the defendant possessed the superior knowledge concerning 
the farm when the representations were made. Rather than 
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select flaws in the plaintiffs' evidence we believe that they had 
ample opportuf!ity to pick out those flaws and to show them 
to the jury or to reveal the weakness of plaintiffs' case, if any, 
by thorough cross-examination. 
From 23 Am. Jur. 861 the rule is stated regarding con-
cealment: 
celt is firmly established that a partial and fragmen-
tary disclosure, accompanied with the willful conceal-
ment of material and· qualifying facts, is not a true 
statement, and is as much a fra·ud as an actual misrep-
resentation, which, in effect, it is. Telling half a truth 
has been declared to be equivalent to concealing the 
other half. Even though one is under no obligation to 
speak as to a matter, if he undertakes to do so, either 
voluntarily or in response to inquires, he is bound not 
only to state truly what he tells, but also not to sup-
press or conceal any facts within his knowledge which 
will materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all, 
he must make a fair and full disclosure. Therefore, if 
one willfully conceals and suppresses such facts and 
thereby leads the other party to believe that the matters 
to which the statements made related are different 
from what they actually are, he is guilty of a fraudulent 
concealment.'' 
(c) The plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the statements 
made by defendant concerning the -reservoir, the Rollins' 
Field and the River Bottom ground. Had the representations 
related to obvious facts, or had suspicious or warning cir-
cumstances existed, it would have been the duty of plaintiffs 
to investigate rather than to rely on the representations made. 
However, the peculiar facts of this case mesh together into 
such an unusually plausible situation that there was absolutely 
no warning circumstance present. 
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The reservoir 'vas located entirely within the area of, 
and surrounded by, defendants' land. Its inlet and outlet 
ditches appeared to come from and end within the farm (since 
the Rollins' Field was believed part of the farm also). In 
vie'v of the defendant's definite statements heretofore covered 
there '\vas no fact that would cause the plaintiffs to inquire 
as to the ownership of others. This is especially so when 
viewing the statement of defendant, Ida E. Parrish, giving 
the reason why this farm was more valuable than that of one 
of the neighbors (T. 123) : 
A. ttWe told him what one of the neighbors had been 
offered, and we told him our place was better than 
his, because it has got better water." 
Viewing the Rollins' Field it appeared quite logical (see 
Ex. E and 7) that the 11% acres was part of the farm. The 
irrigation ditch from the reservoir ran around it, the roadway 
from the defendants' house ran around the field, it was 
fenced (T. 39, 143) much as the rest of the farm-the entire 
area being interwoven with a crazy-quilt pattern of cross-
fencing (See Ex. A), and lay very vividly and clearly in line 
with defendants' land on the near and far sides between a 
long row of cottonwood trees of the creek area on one side 
and hills on the other. It appeared so logically a part of the 
farm that it is not surprising that the evidence shows it to 
have once been part thereof (T. 167). 
To the person believing that the reservoir went with the 
farm, and seeing that this field was also watered from the 
same reservoir, we can again see the inseparability of the 
statements made and the acts of fraud complained of. Putting 
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the situation another way we could say that had the plaintiffs 
clearly understood that the Rollins' field did not belong to the 
place they were purchasing they would have then been put on 
notice of suspicious circumstances because the reservoir was 
the source of its water. They would have then known that 
others might have had interests in the reservoir. 
Defendants' argument that the Rollins field was separated 
by fences can bear little discussion because the entire area was 
cross-fenced. And as pointed out heretofore, fences ran around 
this field also. Furthermore, viewing the field from the dis-
tance of some one-half mile, the evidence was ample to show 
that fence lines looked like breaks in crops from one field to 
another, particularly since fence lines were covered with weeds. 
If the Court entertains any doubt 9n this matter it need only 
look at Exhibits E and 7. The fence lines separating the prop-
erty would have been visible but for three or four rods due 
to brush. 
Although defendants' brief considers such a belief as 
plaintiffs entertained as fictional we contend that it is logical. 
Furthermore, they consider this 11 3M acres of land as a mere 
11 3A part of 64 5 acres ( 2%) . But the evidence shows that 
only 63 ·acres out of the 645 were irrigated. The testimony of 
Lee Rollins clear I y indicated that this was more valuable than 
any of defendants' irrigated land and was larger than any of 
the irrigated pieces of defendants' farm other than the South 
Field (T. 103, 104, 105). In short, this piece stuck out like 
a sore thumb and its inclusion in the farm was of prime· im-
portance in the farm's purchase, far more so than the $2,400.00 
figure the jury indicated its value to be if standing alone. 
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And to remove the faintest possibility that plaintiffs 
might have found· out that the land belonged to another they 
\Veren't furnished with an abstract of title until at least 60 
days after the agreement was drawn up on December 4, 1947. 
The inseparability of the statements becomes even more 
clear when we consider the representations made concerning 
the river bottom ground. The plaintiffs, believing that they 
had purchased an undeveloped farm with a plentiful water 
supply, intended to break up this area and farm it. From 
the conversation heretofore brought out the defendant knew 
of their intentions and remained silent as to his own views 
despite his peculiar knowledge gained from living on the 
farm all of his life. In fact (T. 95), the defendant encouraged 
this belief by pointing out other areas of the farm that he had 
cleared the year before. Plaintiffs did actually break up some 
land on the high ground east of the reservoir and are now 
dry farming that area (T. 42). 
Upon viewing the misrepresentations as a whole and in 
their proper light we can see why no suspicious circumstances 
appeared. Although defendants have attacked each item piece-
meal and thereby seek to confuse the entire picture, such does 
not give to this Court a true picture of the transaction. 
The jury was well aware of the foregoing situation and 
properly found that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the 
representations under the circumstances. 
At 61 A. L. R. 519: 
"The buyer has a right to rely upon the seller's repre-
sentation as to matters which are peculiarly within the 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
latter's knowledge and of which the buyer is ignorant, 
and the failure of the buyer to investigate the facts, 
although he has an opportunity to do so, does not in 
such a case preclude him from asserting against the 
seller the latter's misrepresentations with respect to 
such matters.'' 
The Court's Instruction (No. ~) to the jury carefully 
embodied the foregoing rule. 
In the leading Utah case of Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water 
Co., 63 Utah 495, the plaintiffs came to central Utah and pur-
chased land in an irrigation project after reading representa-
tions contained in a circular that the area was a "thoroughly 
proven general farming district." The Utah court held that 
the plaintiff could recover damages because the land actually 
contained alkali and was not as represented. The further fact 
. that the plaintiffs made some investigation of the ground was 
held no grounds for barring their recovery. 
Plaintiff Rex Pace testified that the plaintiffs "definitely" 
relied on each of the representations made by the defendant 
( T. 53) and that they could see no suspicious circumstances 
at the time ( T. 71) they inspected the farm. Plaintiffs relied on 
the defendant's representations and trusted him, being total 
strangers to that area. Although the record indicates through-
out that the parties referred to each other as "Brethren" and 
in other similar friendly terms, it does not indicate that the 
defendant was a former Stake Patriarch in the L. D. S. Church 
and, as such, subject to being believed by religious men of the 
same faith. This latter fact, along with its innuendo that 
the defendant was a man of high repute, was carefully brought 
to the jury's attention in argument by defense counsel. 
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At 61 A. L. R. 526 \\'e find this rule: 
HWhere, by reason of the seller,s superior knowledge 
or experience with respect to the thing sold, or because 
of relations of friendship or trust existing between 
the buyer and seller, the buyer expressly relies upon 
the honesty of the seller and the latter, s representations 
as to the subject-matter of the sale without attempting 
to ascertain the truth of the representations the seller 
is bound to act honorably and deal fairly with the buyer, 
and is generally held liable for fraud or misrepresen-
tations, although the buyer might have ascertained the 
facts by an independent investigation.'' (Italics added.) 
The foregoing rule was given to the jury, in substance, 
in Instruction No. 4. In fact, defendants' proposed Instruc-
tion No. 8, to the effect that the parties were dealing with 
each other at Harm's length" and that no confidential relation-
ship existed between them, was wisely rejected by the Court 
after hearing the evidence. 
Quoting from 23 Am. Jur. 956:. 
"It is well settled that a representee has a right to 
rely upon representations where a confidential rela-
tionship exists between the parties. In such cases a 
high degree of frankness and fair dealing is required, 
and the representee cannot be charged with lack of 
diligence in failing to make an independent investiga-
tion, either at the time or afterward . . . The same 
principle has been applied where the representee has 
declared himself to be a stranger to the property which 
is the subject matter of the transaction, and where 
the representor enjoys a high reputation for integrity 
and honesty in the community in which he lives." 
(Italics added.) 
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As to what constitutes a ccconfidential" relationship we 
find the rule stated in 23 Am. Jur. 763: 
CCThe term 'fiduciary or confidential relationship' is 
a very board one. Courts of equity have carefully re-
frained from defining the particular instances of fiduc-
iary relations in such a matter as to exclude other and 
perhaps new cases. The cases of parent and child, 
guardian and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, and 
principal and agent are familiar instances in which 
the principle of fiduciary relationship applies in its 
strictest sense. In operation, however, it is not confined 
to the dealings and transactions between the parties 
standing in these relations, but extends to all relations 
in which confidence is reposed, and in which dominion 
and influence resulting from such confidence may be 
exercised by one person over another . . . The relation 
and the duties involved in it need not be legal. It 
may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal." 
The defendant in showing plaintiffs' the farm instructed 
them where and \vhen to stop for purposes of inspection. Be-
cause he used a cane he did not venture from the car very 
far, and this fact deterred plaintiffs considerably in going 
any distance from the car. As to making a more detailed in-
spection Byron Pace stated (T. 91) : 
A. CCI guess we could of, if Mr. Parrish could have 
walked with us." 
The defendant knew that these boys were trusting in his 
superior knowledge and that it would be unlikely that they 
would leave him alone while making their inspection. The 
defendant directed the investigation entirely as indicated by 
the following statement (T. 191): 
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HWell, you have seen the farm, now I guess we 
can go back.'· 
Despite the fact that defendant claims to have told the 
boys to investigate for themselves he cannot avoid paying 
the penalty for false representations. From 23 Am. Jur. 966, 
the rule is provided that: 
"A representor cannot escape liability for his mis-
representations by advising the representee to investi-
gate and to satisfy himself as to the property before 
acquiring it.'' 
In connection with defendants' cited case of Forrester vs. 
Jastad plaintiffs contend that it might be good law, but wholly 
not in point because that case involved a personal inspection 
of the kind of soil involved. Having cleared this issue by 
showing that the River Bottom area, in particular, and the 
Rollins' land were never investigated by plaintiffs, that case 
can serve no point in this lawsuit. 
The general law is well summarized in 23 Am. Jur. 970: 
HThe rule is followed at the present time in practi-
cally all American jurisdictions, in respect of trans-
actions involving both real and personal property, that 
one to whom a positive, distinct and definite repre-
sentation has been made is entitled to rely on such rep-
resentation and need not make further inquiry con-
cerning the particular facts involved. This rule is a 
corollary to the broad principle of a general right of 
reliance upon positive statements. Under this rule it 
is sufficient if the representations are of a character 
to induce action, and do induce it, and the only ques-
tion to be considered is whether the misrepresentations 
actually deceived and mislead the complaining party. 
Under such circumstances, it is immaterial that the 
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means of knowledge are open to the complaining 
party, or are easily available to him, and that he may 
ascertain the truth by p~oper inquiry or investigation." 
That the representations were material, that they were 
made for the purpose of inducing defendants to purchase 
the farm, that plaintiffs were ignorant of the falsity of the 
statements is implicit from volumes of evidence in the record. 
Rex Pace, on direct examination (T. 53), made this quite clear: 
Q. You have stated certain statements he has made to 
you. Did you rei y on each of those statements? 
A. Definitely, we did. 
Q. Did they influence you in purchasing the place? 
A. To a great extent. 
Q. Did they influence you as to the amount of money 
you paid for it? 
A. Yes. 
(d) Damages were proved. The sole remaining element 
to be established in this case is whether the damages awarded 
are supported by the evidence. Inasmuch as $8,470.00 of the 
award of $8,650.00 related to the reservoir, the Rollins' field 
and the river bottom area in question plaintiffs will confine the 
discussion to those items, particularly since the other $180.00 
of damages so clearly sustains itself. In supporting the jury's 
verdict plaintiffs are not attempting to show how the jury 
arrived at its figure-only they themselves know that fact-
but will show the evidence introduced by which the jury could 
arrive at the figure. 
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At the time the complaint was prepared this writer rea-
soned that the case would stand or fall upon proving fraud 
concerning the reservoir. Investigation showed no one in 
the vicinity had any definite idea of the actual value of a share 
of stock in the Northwest Irrigation Company. Lee Rollins, 
Secretary of the con1pany and possibly the most competent to 
testify, admitted on cross-examination that the only experience 
he had had was with this little irrigation company of four 
members (T. 108). 
As pointed out previously the representations concerning 
the Rollins' field and the River Bottom area were so inter-
related and dependent upon the representations with respect 
to the reservoir that no one item could exist in this case with-
out the other two. In short, the land without the water was 
practically valueless and the water without the land was almost , 
equally so. This reservoir did not serve a large area where a 
share of water stock had any established value. 
Thus, it appeared that damages would have to be proved 
as a single unit. Here again, the theory of inseparability here-
tofore mentioned was all important. And in realizing that the 
jury might find against plaintiffs on some particular item it was 
necesary to put in evidence of value on those items so that 
a proper amount could be deducted from the damage evidence 
given on the place as a unit. 
Therefore, the complaint was worded as follows (R. A-4) : 
6 
''That the value of 'the aforesaid ranch as it ac-
tually was when purchased was Twenty-Five Thousand 
( $~5,000.00) Dollars, whereas it would have been 
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worth Fifty Thousand ( $50,000.00) Dollars if it had 
actually been as represented ... " 
The foregoing allegation correctly states the ((benefit 
of bargain" rule of damages followed in Utah, and the writer 
referred directly to two Utah decisions: 
DeFrees v. Carr, 8 Utah 488: 
t (The proper measure of damages in such a case 
(fraud) is the difference between the actual value of 
the land purchased by appellant as it would have been 
if as represented and as it actually was." 
Kinnear et al v. Prows, et al. (1932), 81 Utah 135; 
16 Pac. 2d 1094: 
((The measure of damages for fraud is the difference 
between the value of the property purchased and the 
value it would have had if the representations were 
true." 
See also 24 Am. Jur. 63, citing Hecht v. Metzler, 
supra, as standing for the same rule.) 
And the jury was properly instructed in Instructions at-
tached to Interrogatory No. VII (T. 208) as follows: 
rrMeasttre of Damages: The measure of damages in 
a case of this kind is the difference between the value 
of the property purchased and the value it would have 
had if the representations had been true. 
A. Total Damages pertaining to the farm property 
$·------
In following their theory· of damages plaintiffs asked 
Lee Rollins, whose qualifications are not challenged, the 
value of sa~d farm in 1947, including buildings and watet 
stock or water right: 
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A. H\V ell, I believe, the way farms were selling that 
time and in this locality, we didn't hear of any farms 
selling at the price this farm sold for. We thought $30 
or $35 thousand as a good price at that time." 
There was considerable other evidence, in detail, as to the 
actual value of the place by computing the total of the various 
parcels of land and buildings making up the farm unit given 
by 11r. Rollins and by the defendant himself (See transcript 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 107, 108 and 109). 
In determining the value of the farm as it would have 
been jf the representations were true Mr. Rollins was asked 
(T. 109-110): 
Q. HWell, excluding the personal property, the 
machinery and personal property on the premises and 
including just the real property, the land and buildings 
on the place, and assuming the entire reservoir went 
\vith the farm, and your eleven and three-fourths acres 
of land went with it, and the south field was in a high 
state of productivity . . . " 
(At this point counsel was interrupted and it was 
claimed there was no evidence of the "high state of 
productivity" of the south field, and the Court indicated 
a. condition comparable to "good.") 
'' . . . and, assuming there were 30 acres of the river 
bottom that could be used or farmed, and assuming 
the land in Section 19 was of the same quality of soil 
(as the south field) , what would you value the farm 
at?'' 
A. "That would make quite a farm of it. It would be 
be forty or forty-five thousand." 
Q. For the land? You are excluding the machinery 
and personal property? 
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A. Yes, I would say $40,000.00." 
The foregoing testimony of Mr. Rollins and the other 
witnesses established a basic difference of $10,000.00 as meas-
ure of damages, assuming the south field to be in Ctgood" 
condition. It was later established that the south field was in 
ttgood condition~' (T. 240, 161) and plai~tiffs were unable 
to introduce any valuation showing a different condition. Con-
sequently, the figure arrived at was the total damages to the 
farm based on the fraudulent statements concerning the res-
ervoir, the river bottom ground and the Rollins' field. 
The findings of the jury were consistent in every respect 
with the evidence given. In reading the 5 ¥2 pages of questions 
propounded to them it can be seen that the jury made findings 
entirely consistent w!th the evidence and plaintiffs' theory of 
the case. In denying defendants' motion for a new trial and 
upholding the damages award Judge. Cowley felt that the 
damages awarded and plaintiffs' theory of the case were en-
tire! y proper. 
Defendants condemn plaintiffs' position in failing to seg-
regate damages concerning the reservoir from the other items. 
However, as has been pointed out, the entire lawsuit was so 
interrelated as to make this practically impossible. In this 
respect they once again seek to attack the damage award 
in piece-meal fashion. They argue that in breaking down 
the damage award there is insufficient evidence to justify' 
$2400.00 for the Rollins' field, $1750.00 for the River Bottom 
area and $4320.00 ttin respect to the (Reservoir' and (Water 
Rights'." 
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Plaintiffs originally asked for a general verdict only 
(R. A-37), which was denied by the Court. Then, realizing 
that interrogatories were to be submitted-and wishing to 
protect themselves-requested a general verdict with speeial 
interrogatories. This latter request, also, was denied, but the 
Court accepted plaintiffs' interrogatories almost without excep-
tion instead of those submitted by defendants (R. A~41 & 42). 
The Court then accepted plaintiffs' proposed in~truction 
on measure of damages; but, in so doing, also attached sub-
questions 1, 3 and 5 (T. 214): 
A. Total Damages pertaining to the farm 
property -------.. -----------------------·------------------------$8, 7 so. oo 
1. Does this figure include anything for the 
Rollins piece containing 11% acres. If 
so,· how much?--------------------------·------------ 2,400.00 
~·.Does the total figure include anything 
for the "River Bottom Land?'' If so, 
how much? -------------------------------------------- 1, 750.00 
5. Does the total figure include ··anything 
in respect to the rr Reservoir" and Water 
Rights"? If so, how much?-------------------- 4,320.00 
(Italics added.) 
In arriving at the figure of $8,750.00 we can see that it 
is well within the evidence. The lesser figures of $2,400.00 
(for 11 314 acres of Rollins' ground at approximately $200.00 
per acre [T. 103)) and $1,750.00 for the "River Bottom" 
ground (worth $100.00 per acre if as good as the south field 
[T. 14]-less $10.00 an acre acutal value [T. 105]-or 
$90.00 x 20 actual acres that could be farmed if as good as 
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the south field (T. 94], or, in all, $1,800.00) were arrived 
at very logically. T'hen, in arriving at the figure t(in respect 
to the (Reservoir' and (Water Rights'· the jury possibly simply 
subtracted from the basic damage figure they originally de-
termined. However, this latter conclusion may not have ac-
tually been the case since the reservoir used up over 20 acres 
of land (which was represented as belonging to the· place) 
and since it was worth well over the $7,000.00 expended in 
1943 (T. 101) in enlarging it. 
Considering the further fact th~t plaintiffs required twice 
the water they now have for the land they now farm (T. 48), 
plus what they would need for the 20 acres of River Bottorrt 
ground actually available and the water needed for the Rollins' 
land (the value of the Rollins' land being $200.00 per acre, 
but ((not with its permanent water right" (T. 103]) there should 
be sufficient evidence. 
Under plaintiffs' theory that there can be no proper seg· 
regation of the statements of fraud it is contended that there 
can be no segregation of damages. The Court agreed with 
this contention in denying defendants' motion for new trial 
based upon the damages awarded in respect to the reservoir 
and water rights. In fact ( T. 201), when the Court and 
counsel discussed the matter of damages pertaining to water 
before submitting it to the jury this matter came up: 
MR. FULLER: We have it on the general statement 
of the evidence on the farm. I didn't make issue of 
the stock, certificate of stock. 
THE COURT: That would give the value. 
THE COURT (to Mr. Perry): You just take an 
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exception to . . . the interpretation on the question 
THE COURT (referring to the reasons for having 
the jury individually itemize damages as to the reser-
voir, Rollins· field and River Bottom area) : 
'~I am making a backward approach." 
Actually, the sub-questions 1, 3 and 5 on damages were 
superfluous and the Court so recognized them. They were 
merely given for the purpose of determining whether the jury 
considered a dan1age figure for the different items. This is 
particularly so whe~ we view their wording-"in respect of" 
and udoes the figure include anything for' '-plus the fact 
that the Court upheld the total damage figure on these items 
as against defendants' motion to have the verdict reduced 
or a new trial granted. 
In requiring that plaintiffs theorize the exact method 
used by the jury in determining damages the answer is best 
set forth in the fraud case of Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water 
Co. (supra). In that case, too, the damages were not seg-
regated since there was no showing that the land or watet 
had value apart from each other (See T. 201): 
H ••• It is perhaps sufficient to say that verdicts 
of juries, especially in actions for damages, can seidom 
be determined with mathematical precision even by 
the jurors themselves. If their verdicts can be set aside 
simply because the party in whose favor the verdict is 
rendered, or the court,· is unable to mathematically 
determine how the jury arrived at its conclusion, a very 
large percentage of verdicts would be set aside as un-
supported by the evidence. If the verdict is within the 
evidence and not obviously inco~sistent therewith, that 
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is sufficient and oftentimes all that can reasonably be 
expected.'' 
Mr. Rollins, b,eing a lifetime neighbor of the defenda11ts 
and a present neighbor of the plaintiffs, was reluctant to 
testify too favorably for either. His estimate on the difference 
in value of the property is, in plaintiffs' opinion, very con-
servative. The jury's verdict was well within his estimate. 
Had defendants been in an ''out of pocket'' jurisdiction such 
as California the measure of damages would have been the 
difference between the actual value of the property and what 
plaintiffs paid for it ( $45,000.00). The award for damages 
in such a case would have been $5,000.00 greater. As it is 
the plaintiffs are not nearly recovering damages commensurate 
with their out-of-pocket loss. 
Defendants overlook another important fact long recog-
nized in ·partition suits-that the whole of a farm is greater 
than the sum of aU· its parts. In other words, the Rollins' 
field, standing alone was worth $2,400.00, but its i~portance 
as a part of an existing farm unit was much greater. 
III 
DEFENDANTS HAD A FAIR TRIAL. 
It must be remembered that the defendant had the benefit 
of living in Morgan County all of his life. He occupied a 
prominent position in the church. The defense constantly 
and obviously pointed out the defendants' infirmities and ages 
(T. 125, 126, 132, 187). 
On the other hand the jury could see that the plaintiffs 
were fair and_ honest, answering each and every question put 
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to them. The defendants had a poor memory of all of the 
transaction other than events and conversations which did not 
occur in a manner detrimental to them. 
The jury deliberated carefully for six hours in answering 
5 ~·2 pages of interrogatories insisted upon by defendants for 
the purpose of reaching each issue of the case. It would ap-
pear, as stated by Mr. Justice Crockett of this Court in a recent 
Utah Bar Bulletin that: 
tt ••• Sometimes these requests are so framed that 
it appears that counsel is hoping, or perhaps actually 
attempting to invite error on the part of the court 
so that if the defendant suffers an adverse judgment he 
may have the possibility of reversal on appeal." 
The jury was instructed in a maner most fair to defendants: 
Instruction No. 5 
•tit is a well-established rule of law that fraud is 
never presumed, that when a transaction is explain-
able upon the theory of honesty and fair dealing that · 
theory should be adopted. 
Hence is you can explain any of the alleged mis-
representations of defendant on the theory that he was 
acting fairly and honestly, with no intention to induce 
the plaintiffs to purchase the farm by any alleged mis-
representations, then it is your duty so to do." 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney fo1" Respondents 
705-7 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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